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INTRODUCTION 
Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention1 is recog-
nized by the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 
(the "Constitution"). Article VI, Section 1 of the Consti-
tution provides that, "No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law.,,2 Never-
theless, since 1971, this basic right has not been recog-
. 3 . h h h '1' 4 n~zed by e~t er t e government or t e m~ ~tary. Moreover 
1For the purpose of this article, the words "arbitrary," "arrest," 
and "detention" will be given their "primary functional definitions" 
used by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and set forth in 
its "Study of Right to Be Free From Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and 
Exile." See Study of Right to Be Free From Arbitrary Arrest, Detention 
and Exile~4 U.N. ESCOR Supp.(No. 8) U.N. Doc. E/CN 4/826/Rev. 1 (1964). 
"Arrest" is defined as the act of taking a person into custody under 
the authority of the law, or by compulsion of another kind and includes 
that period from the moment he is placed under restraint up to the time 
he is brought before an authority competent to order his continued 
custody or release him. Id. at para. 21. 
"Detention" is the act of confining a person to a certain' place, 
whether or not in continuation of arrest, and under restraints which 
prevent him from living with his family or carrying out his normal 
occupational or social activities. Id. 
An arrest or detention is "arbitrary" if its is (a) on the grounds 
or in accordance with procedures other than those established by law, or 
(b) under the provisions of a law the purpose of which is incompatible 
with respect for the right to liberty and security of person. Id. at 
para. 27. 
The U.N. "Study of Right to Be Free From Arbitrary Arrest, Detention 
and Exile" was undertaken by a committee of four member States of the 
United Nations chosen by the Commission on Human Rights. The Philip-
pines was one of the four chosen members. See 22 U, N. ESCOR Supp. 
(No.3) para. 82 (1964). 
2Phil. Const. art. IV, § 1; see also id. art. IV, §§ 3,5,9,15,16 and 
17. 
3 See U.S. State Dep't, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 
(1981). The Report admits the "continuing problem" of "military abuses 
of civilians, including torture and summary executions." Id. at 677. 
The Report further discusses arbitrary arrests and the ineligibility for 
bail of detainees arrested under arrest, search and seizure orders; id. 
at 680; the lack of independence of the judiciary; id. at 681; and the 
abridgement of freedom of speech, press and assembly. Id. at 685. 
4The actions of the military are not independent of the government. 
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Philippine citizens who have been subject to arbitrary 
arrest and detention have found little relief. For the past 
eleven years, they have confronted i:lsurmountable barriers 
in their struggle for the recoqni tion and enforcement of 
human rights5 by their government and the international 
cornmunity.6 
This article will analyze the problem of human rights 
enforcement in the Philippines. The Philippine legal pro-
cess will be examined in order to demonstrate how that 
process produces results which perpetuate, rather than 
prevent, human rights violations. The article will first 
present a brief history of the violations and the events 
which led to them. Section II will analyze and explore the 
implications of two landmark cases concerned with martial 
law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Sec-
tion II will also discuss the almost limitless executive 
power granted to the President under the Constitution, and 
examine how the Constitution and the President's executive 
powers thereunder have been amended to ensure that arbitrary 
arrest and detention continue. 
(footnote 4 continued) 
The military acts under the authority of the Prime Minister who is the 
commander-in-chief of all armed forces in the Philippines. See Phil. 
Const. art. IX, § 12. By virtue of a 1976 amendment to the Constitu-
tion, Ferdinand Marcos is both the President and the Prime Minister. 
See Phil. Const. amend. 3. 
SIn this article, "human rights" refers specifically to freedom from 
arbitrary arrest and detention. 
6See generally Maki, General Principles of Human Rights Law Recognized 
by All Nations: Freedom From Arbitrary Arrest and Detention, 10 Cal. W. 
Int'l. L.J. 272 (1980). 
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Section II I will discuss the availablh ty of interna-
tional enforcement as an al ternati ve to the domestic legal 
process. The Charter of the United Nations7 (the "Charter") 
and its recognition and enforcement of human rights will be 
examined. The discussion in Section III will also show the 
ineffectiveness of United Nations procedures when applied to 
the situation in the Philippines. 
The conclusion will present two possible solutions to 
the problem of human rights enforcement in the Philippines. 
The first proposal recommends amendments to the Charter 
which would provide for stricter and more effective enforce-
ment mechanisms than are available at present. The second 
proposal recommends the ratification of a treaty modelled 
after the European Convention on Human Rights. 8 
I. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
During the late 1960's and early 1970's, the political 
environment in the Philippines was extremely unstable. 9 
Lawlessness abounded as groups of differing political per-
suasions attempted to overthrow the government which was 
controlled by President Ferdinand Marcos. 10 The greatest 
7V.N. Charter. 
8European Convention on Human Rights, Europ. T.S. No.5 (1953) [here-
inafter cited as Convention). For text of Convention, see Council on 
Europe, Collected Texts (1978). 
9See gener~ H.A. Averch, F.H. Denton and J.E. Koehler, A Crisis of 
Ambiguity: Political and Economic Development in the Philippines (1970); 
E. Fernando, The Constitituion of the Philippines (1974) [hereinafter 
cited as Fernando). 
10Fernando, ~~pra note 9. 
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threat to Marcos' Administration came from communist fac-
tions, which were rebelling in several provinces on the 
island of Mindinao. 11 
In August of 1971, Marcos responded to the exigencies 
of the social and political situation, which he interpreted 
as threatening national security and public safety, by 
implementing Proclamation No. 89912 (the "Proclamation"). 
The Proclamation suspended the writ of habeas corpus in 
, , f h h'l" 13 certa~n prov~nces 0 t e P ~ ~pp~nes. The Proclamation 
applied to persons then detained, as well as to others who 
might be detained, for the crimes of insurrection and rebel-
lion. 14 The President's Proclamation made reference to an 
alleged plan by communist factions to terrorize the capital 
city of Manila,lS and stated that the Communist Party of the 
Philippines adhered to the idea of "swift armed uprising" 
and to "terrorist tactics.,,16 In addition, Marcos expressed 
the fear that the Communist Party had infiltrated major 
labor organizations and had succeeded in turning major 
student and youth organizations into communist fronts. 17 
In September of 1972, Marcos further responded to the 
llId. 
12proclamation No. 899 (1971). 
l3 Id . 
14Id . 
15 Id .·, F d 9 t 304 305 ernan 0, supra note ,a -, 
16proclamation No. 899 (1971), 
17 Id. 
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poli tical instability in the Phil ippines by proclaiming a 
state of martial law throughout the country.IS This action 
was ostensibly taken on the basis of: 
carefully evaluated and verified informati on, which definitely 
established that lawless elements entered into a conspiracy 
... for the prime purpose of ... waging an armed insurrection 
and rebellion against the government ... in order to forcibly 
seize political and state power in the country and supplant it 
with an entirely new one . '19 based on the Marxist-Leninist-
Maoist teachings and beliefs. 
The imminent threat of communist aggression was thus the 
justification for implementing martial law. 
Under martial law, many persons were arrested for 
"insurrection" and "rebellion,,,20 as well as for other 
crimes such as "terrorism," "possession of firearms," and 
"subversion," which were defined in orders subsequently 
promulgated by the president. 21 Martial law also provided 
Marcos with an independent grant of authority to suspend the 
18proclamation No. 1081, 1 Vi tal Legal Documents 7 (1971) [herein-
after cited as Proclamation No. 1081). Proclamation 1081 provides in 
pertinent part: 
"I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the Philippines, by 
virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Sec-
tion 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place 
the entire Philippines ... under martial law .... " 
"In addition, I do hereby order that all persons present-
ly detained, as well as all others who may hereafter be simi-
larly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, 
and all other crimes and offenses committed in furtherance or 
on occassion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection 
therewith, ... and for such other crimes as will be enumerated 
in orders that I shall subsequently promulgate, as well as 
crimes as a consequence of any violation of any decree, order, 
or promulgation upon my direction shall be kept under deten-
tion unless otherwise ordered released by me .... " rd. 
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writ 'of habeas corpus in any province or in any individual 
case. 22 Marcos claimed that martial law was a temporary 
maneuver which would be lifted within a year.23 In spite of 
this claim, martial law lasted for eight years, and was 
lifted only recently in January of 1981. 24 
During the eight years of martial law (1972-1981), many 
people were arrested and charged with subversion and insur-
rection. 25 In addition, persons were arrested and detained 
without ever being charged with a crime. 26 Moreover, pursu-
ant to the proclamation implementing martial law, all per-
sons detained remained in detention until President Marcos 
personally ordered them released. 27 Persons arrested and 
charged with crimes, as well as those not formally charged 
wi t.h crimes, were detained indefinitely at the discretion 
of the President28 and were thus denied due process of 
law. 29 Prolonged detention, without the opportunity to be 
23See Tasker, The President's New Clothes, Far E. Econ. Rev., Oct. 17 
1980,-at 25 [hereinafter cited as Tasker}. 
24president Marcos offiCially lifted martial law on January 17, 1981. 
See Gonzaga, Rule by Decree Lives On, Far E. Econ. Rev., Sept. 11, 1981, 
at 18 [hereinafter cited as Gonzaga}. 
25proclamation No. 1081, supra note 18, at 7. See also Phil. Const. 
art. IV, § 1; and Aquino v. Enrile, L-36142, Sept. 17, 1974. 
26proclamation No. 1081, supra note 18, at 7. See also Phil. Const. 
art. IX, § 12; and Ocampo, The Advantages of Overkill, Far E. Econ. 
Rev., Nov. 14, 1980, at 29. 
27proclamation No. 1081, supra note 18, at 7. 
28 Id . 
29"No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without 
due process of law." Phil. Const. art. IV, § 17. 
78 
BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL 
heard, violated the detainees' rights, guaranteed by the 
Philippine Constitution, to a speedy disposition of their 
cases before an independent judicial bOdy.30 
II. DOMESTIC ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
A. Seeking relief through the courts 
Filipino citizens, who were deprived of their rights by 
virtue of martial law and the suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus, have generally sought redress through the 
Supreme Court of the Philippines. 31 Most of the cases 
challenged the constitutional validity of martial law and 
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 32 Since the 
deprivation of personal liberty has been justified by the 
imposition of martial law and the suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus,33 the invalidity of martial law and the 
suspension would necessarily undermine the constitutionality 
of the imprisonments. The president's34 authority to 
30The Constitution provides that "[a]ll persons shall have the right 
to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judi-
cial, or administrative bodies." Phil. Const. art. IV, § 16. 
31Aguino v. Enrile, L-36142, Sept. 17, 1974, Lansang v. Garcia, 
L-33964, 42 SCRA 448, Dec. 11, 1971; and Montenegro v. Castaneda, 91 
Phil. 882 (1952). 
32Aguino v. Enrile, L-36142, Sept. 17, 1974; Lansang v. Garcia, 
L-33964, 42 SCRA 448, Dec. 11,1971; and Montenegro v. Castaneda, 91 
Phil. 882 (1952). 
33 See Aquino v. Enrile, L-36142, Sept. 17, 1974, in which the Court 
state~hat the authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus is impli-
cit in the authority to claim martial law. 
34Any powers granted to the Prime Minister or the President under 
either the Philippines Constitution of 1973 or the Philippines Consti-
tution of 1935 are now enjoyed by one in the same person. See Phil. 
Const. amend. 3. 
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implement such measures in certain circumstances, however, 
remains virtually unquestioned by the Supreme Court of the 
Philippines. 35 For this reason, constitutional challenges 
by Filipino political prisoners to the deprivation of their 
human rights have thus far been unsuccessful. 36 
1. Lansang v. Garcia: 37 the suspension of 
the writ of habeas corpus 
In Lansang v. Garcia, petitioners, who had been de-
prived of their personal liberty, sought to nullify Procla-
mation No. 899 which had suspended the writ of habeas 
corpus. 38 In determining the constitutional validity of the 
suspension, the Court first addressed the issue of whether 
the President had the power to suspend the writ. 39 The 
Court recognized the President's constitutional power to 
suspend the privilege40 but held that power to be neither 
35Aquino v. Enrile, L-36142, Sept. 17, 1974; Lansang v. Garcia, 
L-33964, 42 SCRA 448, Dec. 11, 1971; and Montenegro v. Castaneda, 91 
Phil. 882 (1952). The authority to suspend the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus was granted to the President under the Philippines Consti-
tution of 1935. The 1935 Constitution was in force in 1971 when the 
writ of habeas corpus was suspended and in 1972 when martial law was 
implemented. The present Constitution, enacted in 1973, grants the 
above stated authority to the Prime Minister. Phil. Const. art. IX, 
§ 12. See also supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
36 See Aquino v. Enrile, L-36142, Sept. 17, 1974; Lansang v. Garcia, 
L-33964, 42 SCRA 448, Dec. 11, 1971. 
37 Lansang v. Garcia, L-33964, 42 SCRA 448, Dec. 11, 1971. 
38 Id . 
39 Id . 
40The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended pursuant 
to the 1935 Constitution which provided: "The president &hall be com-
mander in chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and whenever it 
becomes necessary, he may callout such armed forces to prevent or 
suppress lawless violence, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger 
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absolute nor unqualified. 41 The Bill of Rights42 and Arti-
cle VII of .the 1935 Constitution43 expressly limit the 
suspension to cases of insurrection or rebellion, or the 
imminent danger thereof, and when the public safety requires 
it. 44 The Court's holding is clearly supported by the 
Constitution. 
The more important issue addressed in Lansang was 
whether the judiciary was bound by the President's determi-
nation that insurrection and rebellion existed and that the 
suspension of the writ was necessary to the public safety. 
I . d 45. h' h h n a prev10us case, Montenegro V. Castane a, 1n w 1C t e 
same issue arose, the Court held that the question was poli-
tical and hence non-justiciable. 46 The Court stated that it 
was powerless to question the validity of the President's 
actions and thus could not even inquire into whether or not 
(footnote 40 continued) 
thereof, when the public safety requires it he may suspend the privilege 
of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part 
thereof under martial law." Phil. Const. of 1935, art. VII, § 10, 
para. 2. 
41 Lansang v. Garcia, L-33964, 42 SCRA 448, 473-474, Dec. 11, 1971. 
42"The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended 
except in cases of invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger 
thereof, when the public safety requires it." Phil. Const. art. IV, 
§ 15. 
43 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
44 Id.; see also supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
45 Montenegro v. Castaneda, 91 Phil 882 (1952). 
46Id . 
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the President had acted "arbitrarily.,,47 Accordingly, the 
Court held that the authority to decide whether emergencies 
requiring suspension had arisen belonged to the President 
and that h~s decision was final and binding upon the 
courts. 48 
Nevertheless, in a decision reminiscent of the spirit 
of Marbury v. Madison,49 the Court in Lansang unanimously 
held that the judiciary was free of any compelling force. 50 
The Court stated: 
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is .... If a law be in opposi-
tion to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution 
apply to a particular case ... the court must decide which of 
these conflicting rules §fverns the case. This is the very 
essence of judicial duty. 
Thus, the Court found that it was under a duty to determine 
whether the President had acted arbitrarily in suspending 
the writ of habeas corpus. 52 
The Court determined that the President's action was 
not arbitrary, therefore, the Proclamation was constitution-
ally valid. 53 In the eyes of the Court, the President's 
evaluation of the nature of the social and political situa-
tion was a sufficient basis upon which to suspend the writ 
47 Id . 
48Id . 
49 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). 
50 Lasang v. Garcia, L-33964, 42 SCRA 448, 473-474, Dec. 11, 1971. 
5l Id . at 505-506. 
52 Id . 
53 Id . at 486-487. 
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of habeas corpus. 
2. Aquino v. Enrile: 54 the implementation 
of martial law 
The petitioners in Aquino, who had been arrested and 
detained under authority of martial law, sought writs of 
habe~ corpus. 55 Several of the petitioners in Aquino had 
never been officially charged with an offense. 56 The Court 
unanimously dismissed the petitions, although the Justices 
differed on the grounds for dismissal. 
The crucial issue before the Court was the constitu-
tional validity of martial law. 57 The Court first consider-
ed whether the existence and nature of the conditions claim-
ed to justify the implementation of martial law were subject 
to judicial inquiry. 58 Five of the ten Justices held the 
question to be a political one and therefore non-justici-
able. 59 One Justice held that while political questions are 
not per ~ beyond the Court's jurisdiction, as a matter of 
policy implicit in the Constitution, the Court should ab-
stain from interfering with the proclamation of martial 
·law. 60 The Justice reasoned that the Proclamation concerned 
54Aquino v. Enrile, L-36142, Sept. 17, 1974. 
55Id . 
56Id . 
57 Id . Martial law was proclaimed pursuant to the 1935 Constitution. 
Phil. Const. of 1935, art. VII, § 10, para. 2. See also supra note 40 
and accompanying text. 
58Aquino v. Enrile, L-36142, Sept. 17, 1974. 
59 Id . 
60Id . 
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matters of national security the responsibility for which is 
vested by the Constitution in the President alone. 61 
Four Justices held that the Court did have the author-
i ty to inquire into the consti tutionali ty of the presiden-
tial proclamation. 62 The applicable test was not whether 
the President's decision was "correct," but whether he had 
t d b 't '1 63 ac e ar 1 rar1 y. 
The Court again applied the "arbitrariness" test64 to 
the President's evaluation' of the social and political 
circumstances which were similar to those present in the 
Lansang case, and determined that his action was not arbi-
trary.65 Thus, under the majority's political question 
doctrine and under the "arbitrariness" test, the state of 
martial law was held to be constitutionally valid. 66 
The Lansang and Aquino decisions have upheld the Presi-
dent's authority to arrest and detain persons at his dis-
cretion. In both cases, the Court failed to consider the 
conflict between the constitutional right of due process and 
the imposition of martial law which abrogated that right. 
The "arbitrariness" test adopted by the Court inquired into 
the relation between the current state of affairs and the 
61 Id . 
62 Id , 
63 Id . 
64 Id , 
65 Id , 
66 Id , 
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President's action. The Court, however, did not state what 
kind of relationship was required. The test bypasses the 
issue Of whether martial law is constitutionally valid in 
light of a citizen's competing right to due process under 
the law. 67 Even if the President's decision to implement 
martial law is not arbitrary, it does not necessarily follow 
that particular arrests made under authority of martial law 
are not arbitrary. 
The Consti tution expressly authorizes the implementa-
tion of martial law,68 and martial law, in turn, authorizes 
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 69 The Consti-
tution, however, contains no provision for the deprivation 
of fundamental human rights under martial law. In theory, 
therefore, martial law and the suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus do not legalize a wrongfu1 70 arrest or impri-
sonment. 71 The suspension only deprives the detained indi-
vidual of the speedy means of obtaining his or her liber-
ty;72 initially, the arrest must be legal. 73 
This reasoning, like the Supreme Court's "arbi trari-
ness" test, fails to recognize that prolonged, indefinite 
67See Phil. Const. art. IV, § 1. 
68See Phil. Const. of 1935, art. VII, § 10, para. 2. 
69 See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also Proclamation 
No. 1081; and supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
70 Fernando, supra note 9. 
71 Id . 
72 Id . 
73See Phil. Const. art. IV, § 16. 
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detention violates the right to a speedy disposition of 
one's case before an independent judicial bOdy.74 If one is 
charged with an offense at the time of arrest, the arrest 
may be considered "legal. " The resulting imprisonment, 
however, is illegal if it deprives an individual of his or 
her liberty without due process of law. 7S 
B. Executive power after the imposition of marital law 
The effect of the Supreme Court decisions in Lansang 
and Aquino is only one of the reasons for the lack of human 
rights enforcement in the Philippines. The unfettered 
consti tutional power of the President, in addition to his 
powers under martial law,76 presents a second and more 
important element of the problem. 
Martial law was officially repealed throughout the 
Philippines in January of 1981. 77 In theory, the social and 
political instability of the country, which justified the 
proclamation of martial law and the 1971 suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus, no longer exist. The state of mar-
tial law which justified "any" suspension of the writ of 
74Id .; ~ also supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
75Id .; Phil. Const. art. IV, § 16. 
76 See Phil. Const. amend. 6. The Constituion also provides that 
"[a) Il-proclamations , orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgat-
ed, issued or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law 
of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even 
after liftin& of martial law or the ratification of the Constitution, 
unless modified, revoked or superceded by subsequent proclamations, 
orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent Presi-
dent .... " Phil. Const. art. XVII, § 3, para. 2. 
77 See Gonzaga, supra note 24. 
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78 habeas cOrpus no longer exists. Therefore, since neither 
martial law nor "political instability" justifying martial 
law exist, human rights should be restored. This reasoning, 
however, has not affected the realities of the situation. 
The Constitution provides that all proclamations, 
orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated or 
issued by the incumbent President, are part of the law of 
the land and remain valid and binding even after the lifting 
of martial law, unless subsequently modified or superceded 
by the president. 79 In addition, the President is author-
ized by the Constitution to issue any decrees or orders 
which he deems necessary, whenever, in his judgment, there 
exists a "grave emergency, threat, or imminence thereof" 
which requires "immediate action. ,,80 In effect, the powers 
enjoyed by the President under the authority of martial law, 
remain unchanged by its repeal. 8l The practical consequence 
of this executive power is that citizens will continue to be 
subject to arbitrary arrest and detention despite the lift-
78 See Proclamation No. 1081, supra note 18; and supra note 33 and 
accompanying text. 
79 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
80proclamation No. 1595 (1976). A 1976 Amendment to the Constitution 
states that "[w)henever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minis-
ter) there exists a grave emergency or a threat or immenence thereof, or 
whenever the interim Batasang Pambans.a or the regular National Assembly 
fails or is unable to act adequately, on any matter for any reason that 
in his judgment requires immediate action, he may in order to meet the 
exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or letters of instruction, 
which shall form part of the law of the land." Phil. Const. amend. 6. 
81While the Philippines remained under martial law the President 
exercised all legislative powers. See Phil. Const. amend. 5. The 1976 
Fifth Amendment states that " ... the incumbent President shall continue 
to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted." 
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ing of martial law. 82 
In view of the LanSang83 and Aquin084 decisions, any 
-exercise by the President of his constitutional powers is 
likely to be upheld by the courts. Future presidential 
decrees which deprive detainees of due process of law need 
only meet the "arbitrariness" test. For example, a presi-
dential order may command that a prisoner be detained until 
the president orders his or her release. To survive judi-
cial scrutiny, the detention order would only have to meet 
the requirement that the president found the presence of a 
"grave emergency, threat, or imminence thereof.,,8S 
The Court in Aquino held that there must be an objec-
tive set of facts or circumstances which constitute "insur-
rection or rebellion" in order to justify a state of martial 
law. 86 On the other hand, the Constitution states that a 
Presidential order of any kind is justified "if in the 
President's judgment,,87 there exists a grave emergency 
requiring immediate action. By basing the legality of an 
order on the "President's judgment," the Court introduced a 
82 See Ocampo, Dissidence and Detente, Far E. Econ. Rev., Nov. 6, 
1981, ~ 23; and Blackburn, A Present from the FBI, Far E. Econ. Rev., 
Mar. 5, 1982, at 13. 
83 Lansang v. Garcia, L-33964, 42 SeRA 448, Dec. 11, 1971. 
84Aquino v. Enrile, L-36142, Sept. 17, 1974. See also supra note 40 
and accompanying text. 
85 See Aquino v. Enrile, L-36142, Sept. 17, 1974. See also supra 
note 8113nd accompanying text. 
86Aquino v. Enrile, L-36142, Sept. 17, 1974. 
87 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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subjective element; yet Aquino held that only objective 
elements could be used to justify martial law. Thus, a 
presidential order issued pursuant to a constitutional 
provision would be subject to a lesser standard of· review 
than a declaration of martial law. Even if an order pro-
duced the same effect as martial law, the Court would only 
inquire into whether the order was an exercise of the Presi-
dent's judgment. 
The President's judgment would still be subject to the 
"arbi trariness" test . But considering the ease wi th which 
martial law passed constitutional muster in Aquino, it seems 
likely that any "presidential judgment" would similarly 
wi thstand judicial review. The "arbitrariness" test does 
not, therefore, significantly restrict the President's power 
to issue orders in accordance with his judgment. 
The current state of affairs in the Philippines is a 
prime example of the abuses of unchecked power. Neither the 
Supreme court,88 nor the legislative body, the National 
Assembly, have succeeded in correcting the imbalance of 
government powers. In light of Lansang and A~ino, there is 
Ii ttle chance a detainee will obtain relief through the 
Supreme Court. The result is the continued violation of 
fundamental rights with the virtual approval of the Consti-
tution and the Supreme Court. 
88It should be noted that President Marcos signed the "Judiciary 
Reform Bill" into law on August 14, 1981, abolishing all courts except 
the Supreme Court and instituting a new system of courts. See Davies, 
The Week, Far E. Econ. Rev., Aug. 21, 1981, at 7. 
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III. INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
UNITED NATIONS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE PHILIPPINE 
LEGAL PROCESS 
In 1945, representatives of the Philippines and fifty 
other nations met in San Francisco, California and unani-
mously ratified the Charter of the United Nations. 89 The 
signatories to the Charter solemnly agreed to, "reaffirm 
[their] faith in fundamental human rights.,,90 According to 
the Charter, the purpose of the United Nations is, inter 
~, "to achieve international cooperation ... in promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all.,,91 
There are several significant provisions of the Charter 
which address the subject of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Chapter IX, Article 55 states that the United 
Nations shall promote "universal" respect for human 
rights. 92 In addition, all member nations "pledged them-
selves to take joint and separate action" [emphasis added] 
to achieve the goals set forth in Article 55. 93 
The Philippine government, as a member State of the 
United Nations, is legally obligated94 to uphold the prin-
89U.N. Charter. 
90U.N. Charter preamble. 
91U.N. Charter art. I, para. 3. 
92U.N. Charter art. 55. 
93U. N. Charter art. 56. 
94See M. McDougal and G. Bebr, Human Rights in the United Nations, 58 
A.J. IT. 612 (1964); and H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human 
Rights (1968). Lauterpact has recognized that "any construction of the 
Charter according to which members of the United Nations are in law 
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ciples of the Charter. More specifically, Article 56 of the 
Charter imposes an obligation on all members to take "sepa-
rate action" to achieve universal respect for, and obser-
vance of, human rights. 95 Hence, in addition to its -obliga-
tion to cooperate with the United Nations in achieving -these 
universal goals, the government of the Philippines is re-
quired to recognize and respect the human rights of its own 
citizens. The Philippine government's failure to fulfill 
its Charter obligations over the past nine years has been 
clearly established. 96 
One possible means of enforcing the Philippines' Char-
ter obligations is through the International Court of Jus-
tice (the "ICJ"). The ICJ is defined in the Charter as the 
(footnote 94 continued) 
entitled to disregard - and to violate - human rights and fundamental 
freedoms is destructive of both the legal and moral authority of the 
Charter as a whole." See also P.C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations - An 
Introduction (1948). Jessup states, " ... it is already the law, at least 
for members of the United Nations, that respect for human dignity and-
fundamental human rights is obligatory. The duty is imposed by the 
Charter, a treaty to which they are parties." Id. at 91 (emphasis 
added) . 
95U.N. Charter art. 56. Although "human rights" and "fundamental 
freedoms" are not expressly defined in the Charter, the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, drafted by the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights, was subscribed to by more than a majority of the member 
States, including the Philippines. Article 9 of that document states: 
"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." 
Article 10 states: "Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and 
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determi-
nation of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against 
him." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. 
Doc. A/810, at 71-77 (1948). See also Study of Right to Be Free From 
Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile, supra note 1. 
96 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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"principal judicial organ of the United Nations. ,,97 The 
duties and functions of the ICJ are set forth in the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice98 (the "Statute") 
which is an integral part of the Charter. 99 All United 
Nations members are "ipso facto parties to the Statute," and 
each "undertakes to comply with the decision" of the ICJ "in 
any case to which it is a party. ,,100 
The establishment of the ICJ as a judicial mechanism is 
an important step toward the goal of universal respect for 
human rights. The Charter and the Statute, however, do not 
compel an alleged offender State to come before the ICJ. 
The Charter and the Statute also do not provide for a method 
of enforcing an ICJ decision. The ICJ is, therefore, unable 
to contribute effectively towards aChieving the goal of 
universal respect for human rights. 10l 
The problem of enforcing the Philippines' obligations 
under the Charter is a procedural one. Under the Statute, 
only member States may be parties in cases before the 
ICJ. 102 The practical effect of this rule is that only 
97U•N. Charter art. 92. 
98U. N. Charter Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
99U. N. Charter art. 92. 
lOOU.N. Charter art. 93, para. 1. 
lOlU.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1. 
102U. N. Charter Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
art. 34, para. 1. These two problems are not limited to the area of 
human rights. The purpose of this article, however, is to examine the 
problems as they relate specifically to enforcement of human rights. 
See L.M. Goodrich, The United Nations (1966) [hereinafter cited as 
Goodrich) . Goodrich has recognized that the limited effectiveness of 
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another member State may bring a claim against the Philip-
pines for human rights violations. 103 This requirement 
presents an absolute bar to Philippine citizens seeking an 
international forum in which to enforce their human ~ights. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that a member State, unaffected by 
the violations, would formally challenge human rights prac-
tices in the Philippines. 
In addition, the ICJ does not have compulsory jurisdic-
tion over member States. 104 Thus, even if a member State 
did bring a claim against the Philippines, the ICJ would not 
have compulsory jurisdiction over the latter. lOS Unless the 
Philippines voluntarily subjected itself to the ICJ's juris-
diction, the dispute would remain unresolved. Realisti-
cally, it seems unlikely that the Philippine government 
would ever subject itself to the ICJ's jurisdiction in a 
case concerning the government's human rights practices. 
The only method of enforcing an ICJ decision appears in 
Article 6 of the Charter, which states that: "A member of 
the United Nations which has persistently violated the 
(footnote 102 continued) 
the United Nations and the ICJ in enforcing human rights is, to a large 
extent, an inherent problem which is not likely to be solved. He notes 
the idealic significance of the purposes and prinCiples of the United 
Nations, yet states that in actual practice many concessions are made to 
the requirements of power politics and national interest. Id. at 260. 
103U. N. Charter Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
art. 34, para. 1. 
104U. N. Charter Statute oL the International Court of Justice, 
art. 36, para. 2. 
10SId. 
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principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled 
from the organization by the General Assembly upon the 
recommendation of the Security Council. ,,106 Expulsion thus 
requires a Security Council (the "Council") recommenda-
tion. 107 Any action or decision of the Council, how.ever, 
requires a concurring vote of the five permanent Council 
members. lOe This requirement grants veto power to any 
permanent member over any action or decision of the Coun-
cil. 109 The concurring vote requirement thus presents 
another bar to the recognition of human rights in the 
Philippines. The United States has openly supported 
Ferdinand Marcos' governmentllO and is likely to veto such a 
recommendation. Thus, the possibility of a Council recom-
mendation to expel the Philippines from the United Nations 
for human rights violations is remote. 
I06U.N. Charter art. 6. 
107Id . 
108Decisions of the Security Council (hereinafter "Council") on all 
matters other than procedural matters are made by an affirmative vote of 
seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. 
U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3. The permanent members of the Council are 
the Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
The United Kingdom and Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the 
United States of America. Id. at art. 23, para. 1. The composition of 
the Council is set forth in Article 23 of the Charter. The Council's 
primary responsibility is the "maintenance of international peace and 
security." Id. at art. 24. 
109Id . 
ll0 See , ~, U.S. Vice-President George Bush's statement to Presi-
dent Marcos, "We love your adherence to Democratic principles and the 
Democratic processes." Wash. Post, July 2, 1981, at A-26. See also 
Anderson, A Gift From Marcos to Us, Wash. Post, Jan 17, 1982, at D-7, 
col. 1; and Sunday Star-Bull. and Advertiser Honolulu, Dec. 13, 1981, at 
A-3l, col. 3. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Philippine citizens have found themselves at an impasse 
in their struggle for the recognition and protection of 
their human rights. The Constitution mandates such r.ecogni-
tion and respect,1ll yet at the same time grants the presi-
dent the power to perpetuate the denial of human rights at 
will. 112 Moreover, the Supreme Court has upheld the consti-
tutional validity of the executive powers,113 and is un-
likely to question Marcos' exercise of those powers. The 
Philippine legal process has thus served to undermine the 
human dignity of all Filipinos and the democratic principles 
to which the government claims adherence. 114 
The United Nations' goal of promoting the respect and 
protection of human rights is indeed commendable, but the 
organization has not provided the effective enforcement 
mechanisms needed to obtain this goal. 115 The lack of both 
domestic and international enforcement of human rights has 
resulted in the continued oppression of an entire nation. 
In view of the incessant and unchecked denial of human 
rights in the Philippines, one questions whether the "legal 
111See Phil. Const. art. IV, §§ 1,3,5,9,15,16 and 17. 
112 See supra note 76 and accompanying text; see also supra note 80 
and accompanying text. 
113Aquino v. Enrile, L-36142, Sept. 17, 1974; Lansang v. Garcia, 
L-33964, 42 SCRA 448, Dec. 11, 1971. 
114To quote the words of Ferdinand Marcos: "Without freedom, the 
whole concept of democracy falls apart." F. Marcos, Todays Revolution: 
Democracy (1971), at 29. 
115See Goodrich, supra note 102. 
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obligation,,116 of respect for human rights, imposed by the 
Charter, has any substance. 
There are two possible solutions117 to the problem of 
human rights enforcement in the Philippines. First, the 
Uni ted Nations should amend the Charter to provide for the 
effective enforcement of human rights. This could be 
achieved by subjecting all members to the compulsory juris-
diction of the ICJ. There is, of course, the possibility 
that a country would refuse to comply with a decision of the 
ICJ. This problem could be solved by expanding the applica-
tion of Chapter VI I, Article 41 of the Charter. 118 This 
article presently provides for such measures as the com-
plete or partial interruption of economic relations with 
those countries which "threaten international peace. " 
Expanding the application of Article 41 to countries which 
violate human rights may be considered a harsh and unjusti-
fied international intervention into the domestic affairs of 
a sovereign nation. 119 Nevertheless, human rights have been 
internationally recognized and are, therefore, of worldwide 
116See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
117A domestic resolution to the problem of human rights enforcement 
is not recommended. A domestic solution would involve, inter alia, a 
restructuring of the Consitution and the present Administration. Such a 
discussion is beyond the scope of this article. 
118U.N. Charter art. 41. This provision presently applies to situa-
tions involving threats to international peace~ As Goodrich points out, 
a situation involving human rights violations is not likely to be one 
that can convincingly be found to constitute a threat to international 
security. See Goodrich, supra note 102, at 260. 
119 See M.S. McDougal, 
157-159-. -
Studies in World Public Order (1960), at 
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concern. 120 
In addition, the five permanent member concurring vote 
requirement of Article 27 of the Charter121 should be amend-
ed. The amendment should provide that a decision of the 
Security Council "shall be made by votes including the 
concurrence of four-fifths of the permanent members of the 
Council." This would make it more difficult to veto an 
action by or a decision of the Council. In addition, while 
a dissenting vote by one member may be based on political or 
economic grounds, a two-member dissent is ~ likely to be 
based on the merits of the action or decision. 
A second proposal is that the member States of the 
United Nations negotiate and ratify a treaty concerning the 
recognition and enforcement of human rights. Such a treaty 
could be modelled after the European Convention on Human 
Rights,122 which grants to citizens of an alleged offender 
nation the right to bring a claim for human rights viola-
tions before an independent tribunal. 123 The European 
120 Id.; see also Goodrich, supra note 102; and supra note 94 and 
accompanying text. 
121 U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3. 
122Convention, supra note 8. The Convention is a multilateral, 
regional treaty for the protection of civil and political rights, 
drafted under the auspices of the Council of Europe. The Council of 
Europe was established in 1948 to achieve "the maintenance and further 
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms." Statute of the 
Council of Eur., 1 Eur. Y.B. 275 (1955), at art. 1. The Statute re-
quires "respect for human rights" as a condition of membership in the 
Council of Europe. Id. at art. 3. 
123 Id. at arts. 24-25. The right of individual petition, however, 
can be-exercised only in respect to states which have specifically 
accepted the competence of the tribunal to hear such complaints. This 
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Convention has proven to be effective, to the extent realis-
tically possible, in ensuring the enforcement of human 
rights. 124 
Moreover, all parties to the new treaty should be 
subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the tribunal in 
all legal disputes arising under the treaty. 125 Technical 
problems such as the definition of human rights, violations, 
enforcement mechanisms, and conflict of law problems could 
be resolved during the drafting of the treaty. 
Realistically, such a treaty is unlikely to be rati-
fied. There is a high probability that nations, especially 
those with repressive forms of government similar to the 
Philippines, will refuse to sign such a treaty. Ideally, a 
Uni ted Nations treaty of this nature would indeed help to 
remove the barriers which now confront Philippine citizens 
in their struggle for recognition of their human rights. 
Christina Anne Lopez 
(footnote 123 continued) 
has been accomplished by fourteen of the twenty-one parties to the 
Convention. 
124 See F.G. Jacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights (1975). 
125 Infra at p. 93. 
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